Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation by Huang, Peter H.
TRUST, GUILT, AND SECURITIES REGULATION
PETER H. HUANG
This Article analyzes the importance of trust in securities investing and how
guilt about breaching such trust has implications for securities regulation. Both
U.S. federal securities laws and the regulations of the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers impose high standards of professional conduct upon securities pro-
fessionals. But exactly what are and should be the legal responsibilities of securi-
ties professionals remain the subject of much debate. In particular, courts disagree
over when broker-dealers are fiduciaries of their clients. A legal consequence of a
fiduciary relationship is a duty of fair dealing. This Article is the first to analyze
the emotional, moral, and psychological consequences of broker-dealers' being fidu-
ciaries. This Article explains how finding that securities professionals are fiduci-
aries can alter both expectations about securities professionals' behavior and that
behavior itself, as well as cause those professionals to feel guilt from breaching their
clients' trust or pride from honoring such trust. This insight has implications for
the costs and benefits of finding a fiduciary duty. In particular, there is an emo-
tional or psychological deterrence effect, in addition to the deterrence effect of mone-
tary fines or legal sanctions, from finding a fiduciary duty. This Article demon-
strates how fiduciary law can affect behavior even without extensive enforcement
or severe legal penalties.
INTRODUCTION
Most individuals do not have the inclination, knowledge, or time
to rely directly upon the companies in which they have interests for
'Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Profes-
sor of Law, University of Virginia Law School. J.D. Stanford University; Ph.D. Harvard
University; A.B. Princeton University. Thanks to Jennifer Arlen, Brad Barber, Howard
Chang, Bob Cooter, Rachel Croson, Claire M. Dickerson, Richard Epstein, Claire
Finkelstein, Ron Garet, Valerie Hans, Tanya Hernindez, Claire Hill, Rebecca Huss,
Jason Johnston, Don Langevoort, Tracey Meares, Donna Nagy, Eric Posner, Ed Rock,
Ed Rubin, Hillary Sale, Kim Scheppele, Warren Schwartz, Keith Sharfman, Matt Spit-
zer, Lynn Stout, Cathie Struve, Cass Sunstein, Steph Tai, Eric Talley, Adam Winkler;
members of this Symposium; the Rutgers-Newark law colloquium; the University of
Chicago Law School work-in-progress lunch; the Law and Society Association 2001
meetings; the California Institute of Technology and the USC Center for Law, Eco-
nomics and Organization Conference on Behavioral Economics, Organization and
Law; the University of Pennsylvania Law School ad hoc summer 2001 workshop; the
Law and Economics Workshop at Boalt Hall School of Law; and the Law and Econom-
ics Workshop at Georgetown University Law Center for their helpful discussions and
insightful comments on earlier versions of this Article. Thanks also to Bill Draper, ex-
traordinary bibliographic faculty liaison at Penn's Biddle Law Library.
(1059)
1060 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA LAW REIWEW [Vol. 151: 1059
the requisite knowledge to make informed investment decisions.' In-
stead, individuals often hire securities professionals for assistance and
advice. Individuals who make their own investment decisions do
worse on average net of trading commissions than do stock market
indices . Even those who invest directly in securities markets usually
do so via such financial intermediaries as brokers and dealers. There
are well-known incentive problems with such principal-agent relation-4 4
ships. A recent Business Week cover story focused on such problems.4
Most securities professionals are employed by large organizations,
such as financial conglomerates, investment banks, or boiler rooms, in
which broker-dealers push certain securities to strangers by making
cold calls (high-pressure telephone calls).
Securities professionals face not only behavioral norms and organ-
izational rules of conduct but also industry self-regulation and legal
responsibilities. Federal securities laws in the United States impose
high standards of professional conduct upon how broker-dealers can
I See M.J. Brennan, The Individual Investor, 18J. FIN. RES. 59, 61-62, 65 (1995) (dis-
cussing the various ways in which individuals are uninformed about investing).
2 Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Courage of Misguided Convictions, 55 FIN.
ANALYSTSJ. 41, 41-42, 47 (1999); Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Haz-
ardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Peiformance of Individual Investors, 55
J. FIN. 773, 775 (2000); see also Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys:
Gende, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 275-78 & tbl.II
(2001) (finding in a study of more than 35,000 households investing via a large dis-
count brokerage between February 1991 and January 1997 that men traded forty-five
percent more and performed worse than women); Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean,
Online Investors: Do the Slow Die First?, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 455, 455 (2002) (finding that
investors who switched from phone-based to online investing traded "more actively,
more speculatively, and less profitably"); Terrance Odean, Do Investors Trade Too
Much?, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1279, 1281, 1284 (1999) (determining that for 10,000 ac-
counts at a nationwide discount brokerage house from January 1988 to December
1993, the stocks bought performed worse on average than those sold); cf Brad M. Bar-
ber & Terrance Odean, The Internet and the InvestorJ. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2001, at 41,
42 (arguing that online trading gives investors an exaggerated sense of control over
their trades).
See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES:
THE PRINCIIAL-AGENT MODEL (2002) (exploring formal models of principal-agent re-
lationships and various extensions of those models in light of the problems of asym-
metric information).
4 See Mara Der Hovanesian et al., How Analysts' Pay Packets Got So Fat, BUS. WK.,
May 13, 2002, at 40 (discussing analysts' compensation); Susan Scherreik, You Might Get
Some of It Back: If You Think a Broker's Tainted Advice Cost You, Here's What You Can Do,
Bus. WK., May 13, 2002, at 46 (providing advice on recovering stock market losses);
Marcia Vickers et al., How Corrupt Is Wall Street? New Revelations Have Investors Baying for
Blood, and the Scandal Is Widening, Bus. WK., May 13, 2002, at 36 (detailing analysts'
conflicts of interest); Gary Weiss, A Sony Legacy the Street Can't Shake, BUS. WK., May 13,
2002, at 43 (commenting on the history of Wall Street scandals).
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and should interact with their clients. But the exact scope of broker-
dealers' legal obligations toward investors remains the subject of
much debate. There has been pressure for increased federal regula-
tion to govern the conduct of broker-dealers because it is unclear
whether an effective regulatory system can rest on the application of
such broad-based and well-established securities regulations as Rule
10b-5,5 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act.6 In particu-
lar, courts and commentators disagree over when the relationship be-
tween broker-dealers and investors is fiduciary in nature under federal
or state law and thus when broker-dealers have well-defined duties to-
ward investors.7
This Article is the first to analyze the emotional, psychological,
and moral consequences of the answers to the questions of when and
to what extent broker-dealers are and should be treated as fiduciaries
of their clients. Recently, a law and economics scholar normatively
evaluated the regulation of securities professionals." His analysis was
premised on an economic theory of asymmetric information that does
not involve any emotions:' In particular, the article did not analyze
whether imposing a fiduciary duty of loyalty triggers guilt on the part
of securities professionals.
This Article analyzes the interaction between expectations about
the behavior of securities professionals and securities professionals'
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002).
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (2000).
7 See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1125-26 (3d ed. 2001) (noting
this disagreement and providing supporting references); Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud
and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1279-83 (1983) (consider-
ing the extent to which Rule lOb-5 should apply to "the full range of activities of secu-
rities professionals," and reviewing court opinions which have or have not held brokers
to a fiduciary standard depending upon the underlying conduct); Donald C.
Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics
About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 675-80 (1996) (intro-
ducing the questions that inform this debate and suggesting in which situations a fidu-
ciary relationship may or may not be appropriate between brokers and clients).
Alessio M. Pacces, Financial Intermediation in the Securities Markets: Law and Eco-
nomics of Conduct of Business Regulation, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 479 (2000) (providing
a law and economics analysis of anti-churning and suitability rules).
9 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 658-62 & n.69 (1979)
(discussing a taxonomy of goods-namely "search" goods versus "experience" goods-
based on the information available about them, originally described by Philip Nelson,
Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970)); see also Michael
R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16J.L. & ECON.
67, 68-69 (1973) (introducing "credence" goods as a third class of goods in the taxon-
omy described by Nelson).
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emotions. It considers whether guilt can motivate securities profes-
sionals' decisions and the legal implications of guilt for the regulation
of securities professionals. The basic notion is that guilt provides an
internal mechanism for legal compliance.'0 In other words, guilt pro-
vides a multiplier deterrence effect beyond the external mechanisms
for legal compliance provided by private litigation, public enforce-
ment, and sanctions. This Article applies the analytical tool of psycho-
logical game theory to analyze the interaction between the legal re-
sponsibilities of securities professionals toward their clients and the
behavioral norms of securities professionals. It concludes that securi-
ties law can foster particular behavioral norms and that choosing rules
designed to increase the guilt of broker-dealers can foster trust and
trustworthy behavior."
This Article focuses on broker-dealers, but its analysis applies
more generally to such other financial actors as securities analysts,
boards of directors, corporate officers, and managers. The analysis
in this Article is based on formal models of trust and so applies to any
relationship involving trust. The recent wave of highly publicized
corporate and accounting scandals reinforces the importance of inves-
tors' trust for well-functioning capital and securities markets." But
10 See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86
VA. L. REV. 1603, 1604 (2000) (discussing how internalization of law is facilitated by
guilt).
Cf Amitai Etzioni, Mien It Comes to Ethics, B-Schools Get an , WASH. POST, Aug. 4,
2002, at B4 (arguing for more ethics instruction at business schools to reduce the like-
lihood of business scandals); Robert Prentice, An Ethics Lesson for Business Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2002, at Al 9 (arguing that business schools should teach their students
that disobeying laws has personal and social consequences).
12 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1789-99 (2001) (making a similar
argument that fiduciary duty principles can alter directors' preferences and behavior
where external sanctions are not available).
13 SeeJeanne Cummings, Bush to Seek Tougher Penalties in Assault on Corporate Fraud,
WALL ST. J., July 9, 2002, at Al (quoting President Bush's statement that "the free-
enterprise system.., requires trust. We've had some destroy the trust of the American
people, and we need to do something about it"); Jeanne Cummings et al., Securities
Threat: Bush Crackdown on Business Fraud Signals New Era, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2002, at
Al (quoting Representative Patrick Toomey's assertion that recent accounting scandals
have eroded "the trust and the confidence that is absolutely vital to the functioning of
our capital markets"); Getting Investors to Trust Again, Bus. WK., Mar. 4, 2002, at 120,
120 (opining that "if Corporate America fails to reform itself quickly, investors could
go on an all-out strike against stocks" and that "[t]o restore investor trust, corporate
executives, regulators, and legislators should act fast"); Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Choice
Says He's No Harvey Pitt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at Cl (reporting on the pledge of
President Bush's nominee to chair the SEC, William H. Donaldson, to restore inves-
tors' confidence in Wall Street); The Tyco Market, WALL ST.J.,June 4, 2002, at A20 (edi-
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even though "trust plays a key role in the formation and function of
financial markets," 14 it "is an important consideration not often rec-
ognized by those considering the role of law in financial markets."'
5
An economic definition of Fs being a fiduciary of P is that P's
consumption, utility, or wealth must enter into Fs utility function at
least on a par with Fs own consumption, utility, or wealth. F breaches
Fs fiduciary duty if P's consumption, utility, or wealth does not enter
into Fs utility function or does so, but only below Fs own consump-
tion, utility, or wealth. Finding a fiduciary relationship between inves-
tors and broker-dealers implies that broker-dealers owe investors a
duty of fair dealing. The existing discourse on the question of when
broker-dealers are fiduciaries focuses on the legal consequences of the
answer to that question. But in the oft-quoted words of Justice Felix
Frankfurter, "to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins [the] analy-
S ,,16
Once a court determines that particular corporate actors are fidu-
ciaries, the legal, cognitive psychological, moral, and emotional sanc-
tions of such a finding are strengthened by clarifying the precise na-
ture of the duty of loyalty that is involved. 7 For example, some lawyers
and commentators have argued that securities analysts at investment
banks who make "buy" recommendations for securities to the public
owe a fiduciary duty to disclose the role their employers play in the
Initial Public Offering (IPO) of those securities. "' Motivated in part by
torializing that "[a]nyone who still doubts that markets operate on trust might want to
inspect yesterday's carnage on Wall Street," and that "[t]he common theme here is
trust, or now the lack of it").
14 Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L.
REv. 741, 762 (2000).
15 Id. at 764. A recent exception is a legal scholar who argues that adaptive expec-
tations-based trust by investors is crucial to well-developed public securities markets.
Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 408, 416 (2002); see
also Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors' Trust in the Securities Markets, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 439, 439 (2002) (commenting on and agreeing with Stout on the importance of
investors' trust for securities markets); Martin Mayer, Comments on Lynn A. Stout's The
Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 449, 449 (2002) (same). Trust has also
recently been recognized as central to doctor-patient relationships and health law. See
Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463, 464-66 (2002) (proposing
trust as an organizing theme for the content and structure of health law).
16 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
17 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 769 (2000) (proposing the hypothesis that "courts possess a
fairly well-developed schema of the fiduciary role").
18 See Crying Foul: Broken Rules or Business as Usual?, Frontline, at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/crying/ (last visited Mar. 21,
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such concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued
a publication warning investors about the potential conflicts of inter-
est that securities analysts face in making stock recommendations.' 9
On February 6, 2003, the SEC voted unanimously "to require Wall
Street stock and bond analysts to vouch that the views expressed in
,,211their research reports are genuinely their own.
On June 14, 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommit-
tee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enter-
prises held hearings entitled Analyzing the Analysts.2 In the opening
statement of part two of those hearings, on July 31, 2001, Chairman
Michael G. Oxley of the Committee on Financial Services stated it
should be standard practice for "the news media to require sources to
disclose whether they hold any interest in stock, long or short, and
whether their firms have business relationships with the company.,
2 2
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, signed into law on July 30, 2002 in
response to a wave of accounting abuses and corporate fraud, ad-
dresses conflicts of interest by securities analysts and auditors.23  The
Act also mandates that the SEC issue rules that require a company to
disclose whether or not-and if not, why not-a company has adopted
24a code of ethics for senior financial officers.
The SEC, on April 25, 2002, launched a formal inquiry, in con-
junction with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers (NASD), the North American Securities
Administrators Association, and New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, into whether analysts provided overly optimistic research re-
ports about their investment banking clientsf1  E-mail communica-
2003), for interviews with SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt and attorney Mel Weiss regard-
ing analysts' activities and duties.
19 Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm'n, at http://
ww.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm (last modifiedJune 20, 2002).
20 Reuters, Analysts' Views to Be Certified, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at C2.
21 Analyzing the Analysts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov't
Sponsored Enters. of the House Comm. on Fin. Serms., 107th Cong. (2001), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/107-25.pdf.
22 Id. at 66 (opening statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, House
Comm. on Financial Services).
23 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 206, 501, 116 Stat. 745,
774, 791 (2002) (making it unlawful for public accounting firms to audit companies
whose senior executives were employed at that accounting firm during the previous
year, and amending the Securities Exchange Act to require the SEC to address analyst
conflicts of interest).
d4 hi. § 406.
25 Press Release, SEC, SEC Launches Inquiry into Research Analyst Conflicts (Apr.
25, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-56.htm; see aLso Charles Gasparino &
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tions revealed that some analysts misled investors by publicly making
positive stock recommendations while privately admitting the poor
condition of those stocks. 2 On May 8, 2002, the SEC approved rule
changes that the NYSE and NASD had proposed to address research
analyst conflicts of interest.27 On May 21, 2002, Merrill Lynch settled
with the New York Attorney General agreeing to "change how it moni-
tors and pays its stock analysts," including decoupling securities ana-
21lysts' pay from investment banking deals. Some commentators and
scholars, however, believe that neither the NYSE and NASD rule
changes nor the settlement agreement will do enough to end the fun-
damental conflict of securities analysts serving two masters: corpora-
tions that pay for investment banking services and investors who re-
ceive securities recommendations. 29 Holding securities analysts to be
ScotJ. Paltrow, SECjoins Pack, Opens Inquiry into Analysts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2002, at
Cl (discussing the SEC's opening of a formal inquiry into Wall Street analysts' activi-
ties).
26 See Noam Cohen, Swimming with Stock Analysts, or Sell Low and Buy High... En-
thusiastically, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, § 4, at 7 (reporting on and excerpting e-mail
messages of Merrill Lynch's analyst Henry Blodget concerning Infospace, Internet
Capital Group, AOL, and 24/7 (an Internet marketing company) in October 2000);
Gretchen Morgenson, Analyze This: What Those Analysts Said in Private, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2002, § 3, at 1 (reporting on a spate of such e-mail messages at Credit Suisse
First Boston concerning AOL Time Warner in March 2001); Wall Street Prophets,
CBSNews.com, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/29/6011/main510454
.shtml (May 29, 2002) (reporting that, after Spitzer subpoenaed thirty thousand pages
of internal e-mails from Merrill Lynch, he "found that what the analysts were telling
each other privately was profoundly different than what they were telling the public").
27 Press Release, SEC, Commission Approves Rules to Address Analyst Conflicts
(May 8, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-63.htm; see also Notice of Filing
of Proposed Rule Changes by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest,
67 Fed. Reg. 11,526 (Mar. 8, 2002) (announcing the rules proposed by the NASD on
February 13, 2002, and by the NYSE on February 27, 2002); Press Release, NYSE, NYSE
Board Approves Sweeping Changes in Rules Regarding Research Analysts (Feb. 7,
2002) (reporting that the NYSE board of directors "approved sweeping changes in the
way member organizations, their research analysts and investment-banking depart-
ments manage and disclose conflicts of interest"), http://www.nyse.com/press/
NT00072AA2.html.
28 Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch to Pay Big Fine, Increase Oversight of Analysts,
WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at A].
29 Cf Patrick McGeehan, $100 Million Fine for Merrill Lynch, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2002, at Al (questioning the impact of the settlement on analyst abuses); Gretchen
Morgenson, Good Deal for Merrill. How About Investors?, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at Cl
(noting that while the settlement is good for Merrill Lynch, "it remains to be seen
whether a result will be as big a victory for investors"); Randall Smith & Aaron Luc-
chetti, How Spitzer Pact Will Affect Wall Street, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at CI (conclud-
ing that it is "unclear how deeply the new reforms [Spitzer] has won from Merrill
Lynch & Co. will cut into the hand-in-glove working relationship between stock analysts
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fiduciaries of their client investors would be another way to help re-
solve this conflict. In particular, holding securities analysts as owing
their investing clients duties of loyalty and disclosure-much like
those financial news columnists owe their audiences-would help to
restore investor trust and confidence.3
The rest of this Article is organized as follows: Part I offers a brief
overview of the statutory and case law regulating broker-dealers. Part
II provides a model of the duty of loyalty in a fiduciary investment re-
lationship. The model applies psychological trust games in a princi-
pal-agent relationship to analyze the relationship between investors
and their broker-dealers. Psychological games have been utilized to
provide insights about social norms and organizational cultures)' The
models I employ extend traditional nonpsychological game-theoretic
models of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 2 The formal model in Part II
explains how imposing a fiduciary duty of loyalty on broker-dealers
can mitigate or deter the misappropriation of investments, not only
through financial or monetary penalties, but also by appealing to a
desire to avoid feelings of remorse or guilt. Albert Hirschman has
noted that making behavior illegal stigmatizes that behavior more ef-
fectively than raising the cost of that behavior, via taxes, for example.43
In other words, guilt provides the benefits of deterrence at rather low
cost. The model in Part II explains how the imposition of a fiduciary
duty of loyalty can alter the behavior of broker-dealers and their cli-
ents even if that duty is not vigorously enforced. Thus, psychological
game-theoretic models of trust permit a formal method of modeling
the emotional, moral, and psychological effects, as opposed to the le-
gal effects, of imposing a fiduciary duty of loyalty. Part III analyzes ex-
and investment bankers"); Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as
Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts 39-48 (2002) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (discussing the rule changes and the settlement agreement and
outlining their remaining loopholes); Dan Ackman, One Really New Rule for Analysts,
FORBES.COM (May 9, 2002), at http://www.forbes.com/2002/05/09/0509topnews
.html (questioning the "newness" of rule changes and pointing out the difficulty of en-
forcement).
30 See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266-71 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
that financial journalists owe duties of disclosure to their readers).
31 See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theoy of So-
cial Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 393-97 (1994) (intro-
ducing the concept of psychological games of trust).
32 See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, An Economic Model of the Fiduci-
ary's Ditty of Loyalty, 10 TEL Aviv UNIV. STUD. L. 297, 301 fig. 1 (1991) (proposing such a
model of the fiduciary's duty of loyalty).
3 Albert 0. Hirschman, Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some
Categories of Economic Discourse, I ECON. & PHIL. 7, 10 (1985).
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tensions of Part II, including the roles of guilt and pride in employee
investing.
I. REGULATION OF BROKER-DEALERS
Many securities firms are brokers and dealers as those terms are
defined in the Securities Exchange Act. Section 3 (a) (4) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act defines a broker to be "any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of oth-
ers." 14 Section 3(a) (5) defines a dealer to be "any person engaged in
the business of buying and selling securities for his own account.,
3
5
The SEC has the authority to hold administrative hearings to disci-
pline broker-dealers. In addition, the national securities exchanges
and registered securities associations, such as the NASD, have the
power and responsibility to discipline their member firms." These
self-regulatory organizations (SROs) have disciplinary authority over
not only their own rules, but also federal securities laws and rules
promulgated by the SEC. For example, the NASD has adopted regu-
lations intended to promote just and equitable trade principles.8 Sec-
tions 19(d) and 19(e) of the Securities Exchange Act provide the SEC
with the authority to review, modify, or set aside (but not increase)
39SRO sanctions.
Brokers and dealers must register with the SEC unless the SEC ex-
empts them from doing so.40 The SEC can deny or revoke the regis-
tration of a broker or dealer if there is evidence of misconduct or false
statements made to the SEC.4' The SEC can set standards of compe-
tence, experience, operational capacity, training, and other qualifica-
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4) (A) (2000).
35 Id. § 78c(a) (5) (A).
36 Id. § 78o(b) (4).
7 Id. §§ 78f(d), 78o-3(h).
38 See Rule 2110 of the NASD Conduct Rules, NASD Sec. Dealers Man. (CCH) R.
2110 (2002), which provides, "A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe
high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." NYSE
Rule 476(a), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2476 (1996), states that the NYSE may disci-
pline a member, member organization, allied member, or person otherwise subject to
the jurisdiction of the exchange who is adjudged guilty of, among other things, violat-
ing the Exchange Act, the NYSE constitution or rules, or any agreements with the
NYSE; "fraud or fraudulent acts"; or "conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade."
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(d), 78s(e).
40 Id. §§ 78o(a) (1), 78o(a) (2).41 Id. §§ 78o (b) (1), 78o (b) (4).
2003] 1067
1068 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 151:1059
tions it deems "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors."" The SEC regulates margin require-
ments for extending credit to investors,41 the borrowing and hypothe-
cation of securities, 44 the trading of securities by broker-dealers for
their own accounts,' ' and the keeping of books, records, and reports
by broker-dealers." C' As this list makes clear, the SEC has the power
under various provisions of the Securities Exchange Act to regulate
specific aspects of the broker-dealer business. It does not, however,
have general authority to regulate broker-dealers' handling of their
customers' accounts.
Because the Securities Exchange Act does not provide the SEC
with general authority to regulate the conduct of broker-dealers, the
SEC applies antifraud statutory provisions to regulate broker-dealer
conduct. The SEC has promulgated a number of rules concerning
disclosure, fraud, and manipulation 47 under the general antifraud
provision for broker-dealers, section 15(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act.4 The SEC has derived even more authority under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act.49 For example, Rule 10b-10 requires
that broker-dealers "disclose specified information ... to customers at
or before completion of a transaction and that they send customers
a bill or confirmation of their purchase of a security. More generally,
Rule lOb-3 prohibits deceptive or manipulative acts, courses of busi-
ness, or practices by brokers or dealers." Most generally, Rule 1Ob-5
prohibits the use of deceptive or manipulative devices by any person
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."52 Rule 1Ob-5
provides a basis for private litigation, SEC enforcement actions, and
criminal actions brought by the Department ofJustice .
42 1(. § 78o(b) (7).
43 Id. § 78g.
44 d. § 78h.
45 Id. § 78k.
46 Id. § 78q(a).
47 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c1-1 to 15c2-12 (2002).
48 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c).
49 Id. § 78j(b).
50 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (2000).
51 Id. § 240.10b-3.
52 Id. § 240.10b-5.
53 Cf Arnold S. Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 on Broker-
Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 869, 876 (1972) (arguing that broker-dealers should be
liable to those who it can reasonably be foreseen will rely on their advice); John M.
Salmanowitz, Note, Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market Hy-
TRUS7 , GUILT, AND SECURITIES REGULATION
Despite its broad scope, Rule IOb-5 does not address all forms of
deceitful securities behavior. Rule lOb-5 applies if a broker lies to a
customer in order to generate commissions from a fraudulently in-
duced purchase or sale of a security. Unfortunately, broker-dealer
misconduct often takes on more subtle forms of deceit than outright
lies. More often, a broker or dealer takes informational advantage of
its customers' deference and trust. For example, in a recent Supreme
Court case, a broker made personal use of the proceeds from selling
the securities in the discretionary account of an elderly man and his
mentally retarded daughter.
The scope of Rule lOb-5 in dealing with misconduct by brokers
and dealers has expanded to address these concerns in two ways. The
first and more traditional approach is deciding that a fiduciary rela-
tionship exists between a broker-dealer and her customers. In such a
case, the broker-dealer owes her clients fiduciary duties and obliga-
tions. For example, in dicta in SEC v. Zandford, Justice Stevens stated
regarding the "in connection with" requirement of Rule 10b-5 that
"any distinction between omissions and misrepresentations is illusory
in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her clients.
5 5
There is also widespread consensus that broker-dealers owe their cli-
ents a duty of best execution for securities transactions.56
Courts disagree, however, over the circumstances under which the
relationship between broker-dealers and their clients is a fiduciary
one.5 7 Some courts presume that broker-dealers are not fiduciaries of
their clients.58 Other courts presume that broker-dealers are fiduciar-
pothesis: A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1084 (1977) (investigating
the SEC disclosure policy and the protection it provides for investors).
54 SECv. Zandford, 122 S. Ct. 1899, 1901 (2002).
55 Id. at 1905.
r, See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266,
269 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (acknowledging the parties' agreement regarding the
existence of the duty of best execution).
57 See NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION: PRIVATE RIGHTS
OF ACTION §§ 2.1-2.2 (1994) (outlining the "relevant circumstances that may affect...
whether a broker-dealer is acting in a fiduciary capacity" as determined by courts in
different jurisdictions); Carol R. Goforth, Stockbrokers' Duties to Their Customers, 33 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 407, 418-31 (1989) (cataloguing the court decisions that reveal a contin-
uum of possibilities for determining whether a fiduciary duty exists).
58 See, e.g., Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d
933, 940 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that under New York law "there is no general fidu-
ciary duty inherent in an ordinary broker/customer relationship"); Lefkowitz v. Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 804 F.2d 154, 155 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that "a simple
stockbroker-customer relationship does not constitute a fiduciary relationship in Mas-
sachusetts").
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ies even of sophisticated clients.' Many courts take a middle position
and engage in ad hoc detailed and unpredictable inquiries as to the
nature of the relationship between broker-dealers and their clients,
focusing often on the level of broker discretion over the account in
question. 6" Thus, the common law does not provide a uniform set of
rules or even standards from which broker-dealers can infer the obli-
gations they owe their clients or even whether a fiduciary relationship
exists.
Two former SEC Commissioners, Edward Fleischman and Joseph
A. Grundfest, also questioned whether broker-dealers have a broad fi-
duciary obligation to deal fairly with their customers. In one case in
which the SEC ruled that securities firms must give priority to their
customers' limit orders before they execute trades for their own ac-
counts as a matter of simple fiduciary obligation, Commissioners
Fleischman and Grundfest dissented from the majority's broad fiduci-
ary analysis."' The two Commissioners would have required further
proceedings designed to determine a reasonable customer's expecta-
tions about her broker's role, given the multiple conflicting roles that
securities firms have had-visibly and for a long time-in securities
markets and the existing trade practices of securities firms.62 These
Commissioners noted that broker-dealers engage in arbitrage, corpo-
rate finance, and market making in addition to executing their cus-
tomers' orders and providing advice or information. Thus, they ar-
59 See, e.g., Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 834 F.2d 523,
530 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that although the investor was knowledgeable about in-
vestments, his broker-dealer still owed him a fiduciary duty).
60 See, e.g., Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206,
1216 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that "whether an account is discretionary or nondiscre-
tionary is only one factor" in considering whether a fiduciary duty exists, and highlight-
ing the greater importance of "examining the entire broker-customer relationship");
Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 96 Civ. 4798 (JGK), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19966, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999) (stating that the scope of the fiduciary duty
owed by a broker to a client may depend on "the particular relationship between the
broker and the client and the scope of the matters with which the broker is en-
trusted"); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 516 (Colo.
1986) (emphasizing "the degree of control the stockbroker exercised over the cus-
tomer's account" as crucial in determining the existence of a fiduciary duty).
61 In reApplication of E.F. Hutton & Co., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,333 (July 6, 1988) (Grundfest, Comm'r, dissenting); id. at
89,336 (Fleischman, Comm'r, dissenting).
62 Id. at 89,333-36 (Grundfest, Comm'r, dissenting); id. at 89,336-40 (Fleischman,
Comm'r, dissenting).
63 Id. at 89,333-36 (Grundfest, Comm'r, dissenting); id. at 89,336-40 (Fleischman,
Comm'r, dissenting).
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gued it would be reasonable for customers not to expect their brokers
to be fiduciaries.
The second and less traditional approach to the obligations that
broker-dealers have toward their clients is the so-called shingle the-
ory. The shingle theory presumes that being a broker-dealer involves
hanging out a shingle to solicit customers.65 The shingle, then, makes
an implicit representation of fair dealing to those clients. 66 Courts rely
on both the federal securities laws and securities industry standards of
fair dealing when utilizing the shingle theory to analyze broker-dealer
conduct. 7 According to the courts, breaching a duty of fair dealing is
fraudulent because it involves breaching the implied representation of
fair dealing. The existence of a fraud allegation in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security also brings the conduct within sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. As a result, both the SEC and private
plaintiffs can pursue the broker-dealer.6
An example of an actionable fraud is the practice of excessive se-
curities trading or turnover, referred to as churning." "Churning oc-
curs when a securities broker buys and sells securities for a customer's
account, without regard to the customer's investment interests, for the
purpose of generating commissions."76 Another judicial definition of
churning focuses on "when a broker, exercising control over the fre-
quency and volume of trading in the customer's account, initiates
transactions that are excessive in view of the character of the ac-
64 See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943) (containing the
judicial origin of the shingle theory).
See id. at 436 (describing Charles Hughes & Co. as "[a]n over-the-counter firm
which actively solicits customers").
66 See id. at 436-37 (opining that when a broker-dealer "holds itself out as compe-
tent to advise in the premises ... it should disclose the market price if sales are to be
made substantially above that level").
67 The NASD's Rules of Fair Practice set forth various components of the shingle
theory, including suitable recommendations to customers and a five percent markup
policy. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, §§ 2, 4, NASD Manual (CCH) 1 2152,
2154 & cmts. (1994).
68 See Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 184, 193 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding
that "a private action under the antifraud provision of § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 exists
against broker-dealers who charge undisclosed, excessive markups on municipal
bonds").
69 See Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498,
1501 (1lth Cir. 1985) (offering a detailed description of churning and the elements
needed to prove it).
70 Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1416 (11th
Cir. 1983).
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count. ',7' A final judicial definition of churning is "excessive trading
by a broker disproportionate to the size of the account involved, in
order to generate commissions.7 2  To define trading as excessive,
some courts examine a quantitative measure known as the Annualized
Turnover Ratio (ATR) of a portfolio.7 ' The ATR of a portfolio is de-
fined as its total cost of securities purchases over a year divided by the
amount invested in the portfolio. 4 An ATR value of 2 means that a
portfolio's turnover is "proportion [all to buying and selling twice the
value of [that] portfolio during a year. A common rule of thumb is
that an ATR value of 2 is considered possible evidence of churning, an
ATR value of 4 creates a presumption of churning, and an ATR value
of 6 is generally conclusive of churning.6
This 2-4-6 ATR heuristic ignores the nature of the portfolio in
question by assuming that all portfolios are similarly situated.77 An-
other heuristic finds churning if the ATR of a portfolio exceeds the
average ATR of mutual funds with similar investment objectives as that
portfolio, plus twice the standard deviation in the ATRs of mutual
78
funds with investment objectives similar to that portfolio .
71 Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Snpp. 528, 534
(D. Md. 1978) (construing Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975)).
72 Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 379 (N.D. Okla. 1975)
(quoting Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 170
(10th Cir. 1974)).
73 SeeCostello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1369 & n.l (7th Cir. 1983)
(noting the use of a turnover rate to demonstrate that a broker's commission relative
to the size of the account is unusually large).
74 See id. at 1369 n.l I ("The 'turnover rate' of an account is the ratio of the total
cost of purchases made for the account during a given period of time to the amount
invested....").
75 JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETiics IN FINANcE 76 (1999).
76 Id.
77 A heuristic is a rule of thumb or mental shortcut used to simplify decision mak-
ing. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging huraistics, 35 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 903, 905-14 (2002)
(explaining how and why federal district judges utilize heuristics in securities fraud
cases).
78 BOATRIGHT, supra note 75, at 76; see also Marian V. Heacock et al., Churning: An
Ethical Issue in Finance, 6 Bus. & PROF. ETHICSJ. 3, 3-4 (1987) (providing examples of
churning heuristics); Donald Arthur Winslow & Seth C. Anderson, A ModelforDetermin-
ing the Excessive Trading Element in Churning Claims, 68 N.C. L. REV. 327 (1990) (propos-
ing the use of mutual fund ATRs as reference points for determining if there has been
excessive trading in broker-managed investment accounts, because mutual fund man-
agers' compensation does not depend on trading activity). But see Robert F. Almeder
& Milton Snoeyenbos, Churning: Ethical and Legal Issues, 6 BUS. & PROF. ETHIcSJ. 22,
24-27 (1987) (criticizing such a proposal); see also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283
F. Supp. 417, 435-36 (N.D. Cal. 1968) ("Churning cannot be,] and need not be, estab-
lished by any one precise rule or formula.").
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In addition to the above ATR heuristics, courts also examine the
volume of commissions as a percentage of the broker's income, the
branch's revenues, or comparable accounts other brokers handle .
Finally, certain patterns of securities trading by a broker may be
deemed to be churning even if they involve a low volume of trade.
These suspicious patterns include cross trading, defined as transfers of
securities among similar customer accounts of a broker; in-and-out
trading, defined as securities purchases followed almost immediately
by securities resales; and switching, defined as replacing a security
with one with similar characteristics.80
In addition to applying the shingle theory against brokers who
have recommended securities that are unsuitable for their customers,
courts use the suitability doctrine to regulate broker-dealer conduct
under section 10(b).81 Suitability refers to the grades of, diversifica-
tion of, liquidity of, and trading techniques for securities. 2 The viabil-
ity of a section 10(b) unsuitability claim was recognized in a case in-
volving a recently retired woman who wanted a yield of $1000 per
month from a principal of $100,000 that she desired to invest from a
divorce settlement.83 Although a broker sold her convertible deben-
tures with the desired yield, he did so at a considerable markup and
without informing her of the risk involved. She contended that had
79 See Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 435-36 (considering the account's turnover rate and
pattern of in-and-out trading, and comparing the dealer's profits with the customer's
investment).
80 See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1369 nn.9-10 (7th Cir. 1983)
(defining in-and-out and cross trading); Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 427 (discussing switch-
ing).
81 See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) (apply-
ing the suitability doctrine in a section 10(b) suit by investors in an oil and gas limited
partnership); Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 803 F.2d 454, 461 (9th
Cir. 1986) (indicating that a brokerage firm, as well as a broker, would be liable for use
of manipulative and deceptive devices under section 10(b)); Kalfas v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., No. 86-3414, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16806, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1987) (holding
that even though the plaintiffs were provided with a disclosure pamphlet their unsuit-
ability claim survived given their lack of financial sophistication in identifying material
facts from the pamphlet); Leone v. Advest, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 297, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(finding unsuitability sufficient to state a cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5); cf Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1978)
(finding the trial court's instruction as to the suitability doctrine sufficient to explain
to the jury the point that "the mere sale of unsuitable securities is [not] a per se viola-
tion of Rule 10b-5").
82 See Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to
Institutional Investors, 2001 BYU L. REv. 1493, 1494-96, for an overview of the suitability
doctrine.
83 Clark, 583 F.2d at 597, 60 1.
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she been told of the risk required to achieve her desired yield, she
would not have purchased the debentures. The court upheld her
claim. According to the NASD, which oversees the nation's largest se-
curities arbitration forums, in 2002 there were 2644 cases in which
customers claimed their brokers recommended unsuitable invest-
ments.8" This figure is seventy-three percent higher than in 2001.
A final example of securities fraud under the shingle theory arises
from allegations of brokers charging their clients excessive price
markups.8 " The case that gave birth to the shingle theory held that it
was fraudulent for a broker-dealer to charge prices sixteen to forty-
86one percent above prevailing market prices. The holding rested on
the theory that when a broker-dealer charges its customers excessive
prices, it violates an implied obligation to obtain the best possible
price for its customers. 7
One commentator has argued that the shingle theory's presump-
tion that broker-dealers make an implied representation that they will
deal fairly with their clients is, ultimately, a legal fiction.8  She ob-
served that the development of the shingle theory falls to the SEC and
SROs through their disciplinary proceedings instead of the courts be-
cause "most cases between broker-dealers and customers now are
relegated to arbitration."8" The impact on the shingle theory of the
Supreme Court's decision in 1987 to uphold the validity of predispute
agreements to arbitrate disputes under federal securities laws remains
unclear." What is clear, though, is that the privatization of disputes
between broker-dealers and their customers means that deterrence of
broker-dealers' misconduct may have to rely more on internal moral
and psychological sanctions than on external legal sanctions.
The above overview demonstrates that the extent, if any, of a bro-
ker-dealer obligation of fair dealing remains in dispute. Both princi-
84 Gretchen Morgenson, An Iceberg of Irate Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, § 3, at
1.
8. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 435 (2d Cir. 1943).
86 Id. at 436-37.
87 See id. at 437 (observing that the natural conclusion for customers was that they
were being charged approximately the market price).
89 Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1271,
1296 (1995).
80 Id. at 1297.
0 See Shearson/Arn. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26, 233-34
(1987) (declaring the historic "mistrust" of securities arbitration to be anachronistic in
light of increasing SEC supervision of the arbitration process and given the federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration, embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act).
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pies of fiduciary law and the more recent shingle theory provide justi-
fications for imposing such an obligation. And, as discussed above,
countervailing arguments have been made that customers today do
not and should not expect broker-dealers to have such an obligation
because broker-dealers engage in many lines of business, some of
which are bound to conflict with their customers' interests. The next
Part of this Article investigates the expectations in broker-dealer rela-
tionships, including customers' expectations of broker-dealers and
what broker-dealers believe their customers expect of them. It reveals
that those expectations can be shaped by whether the law views bro-
ker-dealers as fiduciaries of their clients.
II. HOW A DUTY OF LOYALTY CAN AFFECT EXPECTATIONS, PREFERENCES,
AND BEHAVIOR
Professors Robert Cooter and Bradley Freedman employ a neo-
classical model of a principal-agent relationship to differentiate a fi-
duciary's duty of loyalty from a fiduciary's duty of care in preventing
misappropriation versus carelessness. 9' Cooter and Freedman note
the moral overtones of disloyalty allegations. Frequently, "an allega-
tion of breach of fiduciary duty carries with it the stench of dishon-
esty-if not deceit, then of constructive fraud.' '5 As Judge Cardozo
remarked in a famous passage: "Many forms of conduct permissible
in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties .... Not honesty alone, but the punc-
tilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behav-
ior.' 4 This duty of loyalty is often viewed as the centerpiece of the fi-
duciary relationship, despite variations in particular legal contexts.
91 See Robert Cooter & BradleyJ. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1059 (1991) (arguing that the
duty of loyalty requirement to ignore one's own interests is "inefficient and unreason-
able" in the duty of care context).
92 See id. at 1073-74 (observing the "ponderous language of moral censure in fidu-
ciary cases").
93 Girardet v. Crease & Co., [1987] B.C.L.R.2d 361, 362 (Can.).
94 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
95 Compare AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScOf, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 170 (4th ed. 1987)
(discussing the specific fiduciary duties of a trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust),
andAustin W. Scott, The Fiduciay Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949) (noting the
fiduciary duties of trustees, guardians, agents, attorneys, executors, directors and offi-
cers, partners and stockholders), with J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAw OF FIDUCIARIES 48
(1981) (perceiving "duty of loyalty" and "fiduciary duty" as almost interchangeable
terms).
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For example, ERISA augments the common law duty of loyalty by ex-
plicitly forbidding self-dealing.
9
In contrast, corporate law does not prohibit self-dealing. Instead,
it raises the level of judicial review of self-interested transactions by
managers under a fairness test. Delaware corporate fiduciary duty law
can be understood "as a set of parables or folktales of good and bad
managers and directors, tales that collectively describe their normative
role."97 This normative view of Delaware corporate fiduciary law im-
plies thinking "ofjudges more as preachers than as policemen."9' The
judges' opinions can be thought of as 'judicial sermons that exhort
managers to consummate performance and that criticize those who
perform below expectations, even if, or perhaps especially when, no
direct legal sanction is imposed."99 Delaware courts help develop and
transmit legally unenforceable rules about corporate behavior.00
They do so both via the imposition of legal sanctions and through
"the development or internalization of appropriate modes of behav-
ior, coupled with the withering denunciations of self-dealing that
courts are capable of delivering."'' 1 Such a theory of Delaware corpo-
rate law builds on work focusing on judicial storytelling in the law-and-
narrative literature.' °  This normative approach to Delaware corpo-
rate law cases is similar to the use of the common law to understand
norms of secrecy.1'
0 3
96 Employee Retirement Income Security Program of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§
1104(a)(1), 1106(b) (2000).
97 Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REv. 1009,1106 (1997).
98 Id. at 1016.
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator of Self-Governance,
34 GA. L. REv. 529, 529 (2000).
100 See, e.g., Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-Breach of Piduciary Duty or
Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MAR' L. REv. 2023, 2065-85 (2002) (concluding that a
CEO's decision to purchase hot IPO shares for his own account constitutes a breach of
a fiduciary duty because doing so usurps a corporate opportunity, and considering the
effect of judicial decisions on the business community's and investors' expectations
about whether such behavior constitutes a fair business practice).
101 Rock & Wachter, supra note 99, at 541.
102 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.
L. REV. 179, 183 (1985) (arguing "that there are sacred narratives of jurisdiction that
might constitute the texts to ground judicial commitments").
103 See KiM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
COMMON LAW 86-108 (1988) (proposing a theory of interpretation that focuses on the
legal construction of precedent and its judicial application to facts in order to better
understand the interpretive nature of law).
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The game tree in Figure 1 is a simplification of the game tree in
Figure 1 of Cooter and Freedman's appropriation-incentive model.1
0 4
This game also modifies David Kreps's game of trust. In the game
tree depicted in Figure 1, an investor can decide not to hire a broker-
dealer and the status quo payoffs are normalized to be $0 for both
players. Alternatively, the investor can hire the broker-dealer and
make an investment of $I, which can have an expected gross return of
$R If the broker-dealer does not misbehave, then the broker-dealer
earns a fee of $F The investor earns an expected net return of $N,
where N = R - I - F. Alternatively, there is an endogenous probability
of the broker-dealer's choosing to falsely report the results of the in-
vestment, to churn the investor's portfolio, or to misbehave in some
other manner. In such a case, the investor receives only a low return
of $L. The broker-dealer, however, enjoys material gains of $A. If F >
A, then broker-dealers do not misbehave if hired and so investors hire
broker-dealers.
Figure 1: A Securities Investing Game
Don't (N, F)
Misbehave
p
Broker
Hire Misbehave 1
Investor (L,A)
Don't Hire (0, 0)
p = the probability the broker chooses not to misbehave. Thefirst number in each
pair is the investor's payoff and the second number in each pair is the broker's
payoff
104 Cooter & Freedman, supra note 91, at 1050 fig.I.
105 David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PosrrivE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 100 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990).
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Suppose that F < A. Then, the unique subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium0 6 of this game involves the broker-dealer's misbehaving if
hired, and so the investor's not hiring the broker-dealer. In other
words, neither player has a unilateral incentive to deviate from her
strategy choice. The subgame-perfect restriction essentially rules out
behavior that is not consistent over time.
But in reality, investors do hire broker-dealers to make invest-
ments. The neoclassical view is that deterrence in the form of ex-
pected fines, penalties, or sanctions provides broker-dealers with the
incentives to behave properly. This approach is depicted in Figure 2.
The payoff to risk-neutral broker-dealers from misbehaving is A -E,
where E denotes the expected punishment from such misbehavior.
The variable E is the result of multiplying the probability of punish-
ment by the magnitude of punishment.
Figure 2: Neoclassical Deterrence in a Securities Investing Game
Don't (N, F)
Misbehave
Broker <
Hire Misbehave 1 p
Investor < (L,A- E)
Don't Hire (0, 0)
p = the probability the broker chooses not to misbehave. Thefirst number in each
pair is the investor's payoff and the second number in each pair is the broker's
payoff
Depending on the size of E, this new game has the following pos-
sible equilibrium outcomes: If E < A - F, the only equilibrium is that
of the game in Figure 1 where an investor does not hire the broker-
dealer who would misbehave if hired. If E > A - J, the only equilib-
106 A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies, one for each player, that are best re-
sponses to each other. E.g., H. SCOrT BIERMAN & Luis FERNANDEZ, GAME THEORY
wrrH ECONOMIc APPLICATIONS 16 (2d ed. 1998).
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rium is a new one where the investor hires the broker-dealer who does
not misbehave because E, the expected punishment, outweighs the
monetary gain of misbehaving. If E = A - F, there is an infinite num-
ber of equilibrium outcomes in which the broker-dealer is indifferent
between misbehaving or not.10 7 For example, if the gains from misbe-
havior are particularly large, (that is, if A is large), we are back to the
unique equilibrium of Figure 1. If E is small because the probability
of punishment or the magnitude of punishment (or both) is small,
then we return to the unique equilibrium of Figure 1. Factually, there
are reasons to expect A to be large or E to be small in many securities
cases involving broker-dealers. Increasing E, by increasing the level of
enforcement or the degree of punishment, is thus one way to increase
deterrence in the neoclassical model. The models below demonstrate
that another way to increase deterrence is to find a fiduciary duty. In
addition, to achieve a given level of deterrence, the degree of pun-
ishment or the level of enforcement need not be increased as much as
in the neoclassical model when increasing the degree of punishment
or the level of enforcement has psychological or moral deterrence ef-
fects.
A second, oft-cited reason that investors hire broker-dealers is that
investors believe the value of broker-dealers' reputations motivate
them to avoid misbehaving. This belief is premised on the existence
of market forces that discipline, if not prevent, broker-dealers' misbe-
havior. For example, in the long run, a broker-dealer depends on on-
going relationships for commissions. Game theory describes these re-
lationships as being between repeat players. Such repeat play
considerations do not exist if the broker-dealer is in the "last period"
or suffers from the "endgame problem," as she likely will if she is
about to misappropriate a particularly large sum of money.
Emotional preferences can reduce misbehavior even if the broker-
dealer relationship has just one period remaining. So emotional
preferences differ from the above reputation story, but emotions and
reputation are not mutually exclusive. In a sense, emotions complete
the reputation story because reputations may relate to whether a bro-
ker-dealer is a good type who feels guilt from misbehaving or a bad
107 These are computed by setting pN = L(1 - p). The resulting equilibrium out-
comes involve the individual investor's hiring if the broker-dealer would choose not to
misappropriate with probability p > L/(N+ L); the individual investor's not hiring if the
broker-dealer would choose to not misappropriate with probability p < L/(N + L); and
the individual investor's being indifferent if the broker-dealer would choose not to
misappropriate with probability p = L/(N+ L).
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type who does not. This account of emotional preferences as private
information that can be signaled provides an alternative to Eric Pos-
ner's work on signaling discount rates.'08
A broker-dealer who feels guilt from engaging in misbehavior is
captured by the game tree in Figure 3. The payoffs in Figure 3 differ
from those in Figure 1 according to the broker-dealer's level of guilt
for engaging in misbehavior. Instead of receiving $A, an emotional
broker-dealer has a total payoff of $(A - G), where G is the monetary
equivalent of guilt, or A - G, where both A and G express the broker-
dealer's utility. Depending on the size of G, this new game has the fol-
lowing equilibria: If G < A - F, the only equilibrium is the one in the
game in Figure 1, where the investor does not hire a misappropriating
broker-dealer. If G > A - F, the only equilibrium is a new one where
the investor hires the broker-dealer who does not misbehave because
the resulting guilt swamps the monetary gain of misbehaving. If G = A
-Fi, there is an infinite number of equilibrium outcomes in which the
broker-dealer is indifferent between misbehaving or not and any
probability mixture of those strategies." Thus, adding guilt can
change the equilibrium outcome of the investing game.
Figure 3: Guilt in a Securities Investing Game
Don't (N, F)
Misbehave
Broker <
Hire Misbehave ip
Investor (L,A- G)
Don't Hire (0, 0)
p = the probability the broker chooses not to misbehave. Thefirst number in each
pair is the investor's payoff and the second number in each pair is the broker's
payoff
108 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SocIAL NORMS 18-19 (2000) (discussing the sig-
naling of "good" and "bad" types' discount rates).
10 Compare these outcomes with those stated for Figure 2, supra note 107.
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The game in Figure 4 combines the games in Figures 2 and 3 by
analyzing broker-dealers who face both external sanctions and inter-
nal guilt from misbehaving. But the games in Figures 3 and 4 beg the
questions of what determines how much guilt a broker-dealer feels
and from what that guilt originates. People's propensities to feel guilt
vary based upon such demographic variables as their age, culture,
ethnicity, gender, upbringing, norms, and other unobservable differ-
ences. It is also unclear whether broker-dealers feel guilt because of a
fear of getting caught breaking the law or morally disappointing their
clients. Guilt derived from a fear of getting caught breaking the law is
instrumental, while guilt based on clients' moral disappointment is in-
trinsic or ethical. The first sort of guilt is also closely related to the
shame or public humiliation of being caught breaking the law.110 The
game depicted in Figure 5 focuses on the moral disappointment as-
pect of guilt. It also provides a model of guilt that partly depends on
expectations about the behavior of broker-dealers. A broker-dealer's
payoffs are motivated by the notion that the broker-dealer cares more
about being loyal the more she expects that clients expect loyalty.
Figure 4: Sanctions and Guilt in a Securities Investing Game
Don't (N, F)
Misbehave
p
Broker 
e
Hire Misbehave I -
Investor < Misbehave (L, A- E- G)
Don't Hire (0,0)
p = the probability the broker chooses not to misbehave. Thefirst number in each
pair is the investors payoff and the second number in each pair is the broker's
payoff
110 See Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property
Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435, 460-64 (2000) (analyzing how shame affects be-
havior).
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Figure 5: A Psychological Emotional Investing Game
Don't (N, F)
Misbehave
Broker <
HoMisbehave1 p
Investor (L, A - E - G - Mr)
Don't Hire (0,0)
p = the probability the broker chooses not to misbehave. r = broker's expectation of
investor's expectation over p. The first number in each pair is the investor's payoff
and the second number in each pair is the brokers payoff
Psychological games provide analytical models for a particular
category of emotions, namely emotions that depend on expectations
about strategic behavior."' Psychological game theory offers a formal
mathematical apparatus for studying interactive situations in which at
least one individual's utility is a function notjust of strategic decisions,
but also of some other individual's expectations over (possibly an-
other individual's expectations over, and so forth) strategy choices."
2
Fear and hope are two emotions that by their very nature depend on
an individual's expectations for the future. Often, such expectations
are related to, or depend on, the strategic decisions of another indi-
vidual. For example, second marriages are often said to involve "the
triumph of hope over experience."
Psychological game theory may be applied to a variety of phe-
nomena. One economist has formulated psychological game-
theoretic models of pricing and employment practices to explain why
firms neither always charge monopoly prices when they can nor be-
have toward workers as neoclassical labor economics predicts."' ' An-
II See John Geanakoplos et al., Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality, 1
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 60, 65, 70-74 (1989) (defining psychological games).
12 See Van Kolpin, Equilibrium Refinement in Psychological Games, 4 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 218, 220-21, 229-31 (1992) (providing an alternative definition of psychological
games).
113 See Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Eairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM.
ECON. REV. 1281, 1284-90, 1292-96 (1993) (constructing strategic-form psychological
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other economist has constructed psychological games of gift giving in-
volving such expectation-dependent emotions as disappointment,
embarrassment, surprise, and pride. ' 4 Such models have implications
for industrial relations, giving holiday gifts, and tipping service pro-
viders."' There are several psychological game-theoretic models of le-
gal interactions."'
Suppose that an investor and a broker-dealer are playing the
modified securities investment game depicted in Figure 5.'7 The vari-
able p denotes the endogenous probability that a particular broker-
dealer will not abuse an investor's trust. Let q denote that investor's
expectation of the variable p. In other words, q is the mean of the in-
vestor's subjective distribution over the probability p. Let r denote the
broker-dealer's expectation of q. The variable r is an example of what
is known as a second-order expectation, while the variable q is an ex-
ample of what is known as a first-order expectation."" For simplicity,
assume that psychological guilt is a multiple M times r, the broker-
dealer's expectations over the investor's expectations over the prob-
ability that the broker-dealer will not abuse trust if entrusted. The as-
sumption that part of a broker-dealer's guilt from misappropriation
depends on the size of r captures the idea that guilt includes a psycho-
games involving fairness to study the prices that monopolists actually charge and the
personnel policies that firms actually employ).
114 See BradleyJ. Ruffle, Gift Giving with Emotions, 39J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 399,
400 (1999) (arguing that while gift giving sometimes involves strategic considerations,
it always involves emotional ones).
15 Id. at412-16.
116 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Dangers of Monetary Commensurability: A Psychological
Game Model of Contagion, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1701 (1998) (analyzing the concern that
commodification and monetary commensurability will become universal); Peter H.
Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 31
(1992) (modeling the role of emotions in decisions to sue, settle, or go to trial); Peter
H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 639 (1999) (study-
ing the ethical, legal, and social implications of utilizing free markets in reproductive
technologies and genetic engineering); Peter H. Huang, International Environmental
Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 256-57 (2002) (proving that
the fear of losing face induces compliance with international environmental law);
Huang, supra note 110 (analyzing emotions in bargaining over property rights); Huang
& Wu, supra note 31 (studying the role that guilt can play in sustaining the honoring of
trust in principal-agent relationships).
17 This game is akin to the psychological game of trust in Figure 2 of Huang &
Wu, supra note 31, at 394. The differences are the numerical payoff values and the in-
terpretation of p here being the actual probability of not misbehaving by the broker-
dealer, while p in the psychological game of trust is the proportion of a population of
agents that choose not to abuse trust.
118 See Geanakoplos et al., supra note 111, at 70-78, for a discussion of higher-
order expectations.
1084 UN! VERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 151:1059
logical component. The assumption that psychological guilt depends
linearly on the variable ris for analytical tractability.
In order to fulfill the condition of rational expectations required
by a psychological equilibrium, p = q = r in equilibrium. There are
three psychological equilibrium outcomes." '  The first equilibrium in-
volves the investor's choosing to hire the broker-dealer and p = q = r =
I or the broker-dealer's choosing, with probability one, not to misbe-
have, with associated payoffs (N, F). A second equilibrium involves
the investor's choosing never to hire a broker-dealer and p = q = r = 0
or the broker-dealer's choosing to misbehave if given that opportu-
nity. The associated payoffs are (0, 0). The third equilibrium involves
the investor's choosing to hire the broker-dealer and p = q = r = (A - G
- F)/M, provided that 0 < (A - G - F)/M < 1. These inequalities re-
quire that A - G > Fand A - G - F < M. The associated payoffs are (pN
+ (1 - p)L, F). The third equilibrium only exists if pN + (I - p)L > 0.
The third and only completely mixed strategy equilibrium is found by
setting the broker-dealer's payoffs from engaging in misbehavior and
from not engaging in it equal-F = A - G - Mr-and setting p = r.
In the first equilibrium, the broker-dealer relationship occurs and
the broker-dealer does not misbehave because she expects that the in-
vestor expects that the broker-dealer will not misbehave. If a broker-
dealer were to misbehave, she would experience guilt to such a degree
that she would prefer not to misbehave. In the second equilibrium,
the broker-dealer relationship does not occur, and broker-dealers
would misbehave if given the opportunity due to their expectations
that investors expect such misbehavior and their consequent lack of
guilt upon misbehaving. Alternatively, misbehavior can lead broker-
dealers to feel guilt, but only to such a small degree that misbehaving
still dominates not misbehaving. In the third equilibrium, the broker-
dealer relationship occurs despite the fact that the broker-dealer mis-
behaves some fraction of the time because that still makes investors
strictly better off than if they do not hire broker-dealers.
One can think of the three different equilibrium beliefs as reflect-
ing the strength of a duty of loyalty for the broker-dealer relationship.
The first equilibrium occurs when the duty of loyalty is strongest. The
second equilibrium occurs when the duty of loyalty is weakest (nonex-
istent). The third equilibrium occurs when the duty of loyalty is in-
19 A psychological equilibrium requires not only the usual Nash equilibrium
property that players' strategies are best responses to each other, but also that players'
expectations are correct in equilibrium. See Geanakoplos et al., sunva note 111, at 66,
for the formal definition of a psychological equilibrium.
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termediate in strength. In contrast to the unique equilibrium for the
original broker-dealer game without psychological payoffs in Figure 1,
the presence of psychological guilt makes possible multiple equilib-
rium outcomes-in particular, the first and third equilibrium out-
comes. In these two equilibrium outcomes, the corresponding equi-
librium expectations and psychological emotional payoffs support
reduced misbehavior. This model, then, reveals that imposing a fidu-
ciary duty on broker-dealers creates a perceived duty of loyalty and, by
doing so, endogenously changes broker-dealers' and investors' expec-
tations about broker-dealer behavior as well as broker-dealers' behav-
ior itself. Those expectations, in turn, can form a self-enforcing equi-
librium of behavior and expectations about behavior, should broker-
dealers have the sort of preferences described above.
If broker-dealers are viewed as being legally subject to a fiduciary
duty of loyalty, their preferences and hence their behavior can de-
pend on their expectations about investors' expectations about bro-
ker-dealers' behavior. Broker-dealer preferences are endogenous be-
cause they depend on expectations, and those expectations are
determined endogenously in equilibrium. When preferences are en-
dogenous, law can influence broker-dealer preferences and broker-
dealer behavior by selecting particular expectations as focal points.
This role that fiduciary law can play in securities law is analogous
to the preference-shaping role of criminal law."" Criminal law may al-
ter behavior not only by changing the cost of satisfying fixed prefer-
ences via fines and punishments, but also by dampening socially un-
desirable preferences themselves. The endogenous nature of
fiduciary preferences can mitigate the problem of misbehavior. Bro-
ker-dealers can be induced by their legal status as fiduciaries to have
preferences that depend on their expectations of their clients' expec-
tations about broker-dealers' behavior. This is true even if that fiduci-
ary duty is not legally enforced or, more realistically, underenforced,
at least in the short run. Some level of legal enforcement over time is
required; otherwise, broker-dealers will come to expect that no en-
120 Cf Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Prefer-
ence-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE LJ. 1, 31-32 (describing punishment and the preference-
shaping theory of criminal law); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Opportunity Shaping, Prefer-
ence Shaping, and the Theory of Criminal Law, in MORALnrY, RATIONALrFY, AND
EFFICIENcY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOcIo-ECONOMIcS 41 (Richard M. Coughlin ed.,
1991) (providing an economically based analysis of preference shaping in criminal
law).
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forcement will occur. The power of fiduciary law is that it can harness
emotions to comply with socially desirable norms of behavior.
The chief counsel in the SEC's Office of Compliance Inspections
and Examinations recently argued that moral aspirations played a sig-• • 121
nificant role in the genesis of U.S. federal regulation of securities.
In the above models, fiduciary law provides deterrence not only via le-
gal and monetary penalties, but also via expressive and symbolic roles
that involve moral and emotional incentives. These roles are clearly
related to expressive accounts of law. 2 2 The above models demon-
strate the expressive deterrence effect of finding a fiduciary duty on
the part of securities professionals. Cass Sunstein focuses on how law
may change the social meaning of particular actions.1 2 3 Lawrence Les-
sig notes the variance in the social meanings of acts across time and
cultures and how laws such as anti-dueling statutes in the southern
United States may have provoked changes in the social meanings of
dueling.2 4 Dan Kahan considers how criminal law can deter crime via
its social influence and social meaning.1 15 But according to Kahan,
more severe punishments can have adverse social expressive conse-1261
quences. Punishments in Kahan's analysis also express a commu-
1 • " 27
nity's moral condemnation. In Figure 5, there is no such necessary
relationship between the size or form of the punishment and guilt. In
terms of the notation introduced earlier and utilized in Figure 5, E, G,
and M can be independent exogenous variables or G and/or M might
depend on E, in particular the certainty of punishment, C, or the se-
verity of punishment, S. In other words, if the expected punish-
121John H. Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring Fed-
eral Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2001) (explain-
ing the fundamental role of a moral purpose in the creation of legislative, administra-
tive, andjudicial aspects of securities regulation).
122 See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critical discussion of expressive accounts of law).
123 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2034 (1996) (discussing how law changes the social meaning of actions such as wearing
seatbelts or smoking cigarettes).
124 SeLwec esg h euainaFSee Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CI1. L. REV. 943,
964-73 (1995) (analyzing how law changes the social meaning of civil rights actions,
dueling, and wearing helmets); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2186 (1996) (discussing dueling regulation).
125 See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349 (1997) (providing a theory of the social meaning of criminal law and its alternative
sanctions).
126 See id. at 377-82 (explaining how severe punishments can reduce the willingness
of law-abiding citizens to cooperate with police, particularly in minority communities).
127 Id. at 383.
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ment-E = CS-G and/or M might be functions of C or S. Guilt and
the severity of punishment might interact in such ways, but what is
crucial to note is that such interactions are not necessary.
The role that fiduciary law can play in the above models is more
akin to McAdams's analysis of the focal expressive role of law."" The
law in McAdams's analysis enjoys a comparative advantage over other
forms of third-party expression for three reasons. First, if a law is suf-
ficiently well publicized, that law can become common knowledge.1
29
Common knowledge of a law helps that law coordinate expectations.
Something is common knowledge between A and B if (1) A knows it;
(2) B knows it; (3) A knows that B knows it; (4) B knows that A knows
it; (5) A knows that B knows that A knows it; (6) B knows that A knows
that B knows it; and so forth ad infinitum.
3 0
Second, if a law is unique to a given situation, more people are
likely to pay attention to it. 3 Referred to as the emphatic nature of
law, such laws arguably have greater "moral credibility.' ', 3 2 This second
advantage of law over some other type of third-party expression is also
related to that law's unique legitimacy in creating internalized norms
to obey the law.
33
Third is the notion thatjudges and legislators develop reputations
for being norm entrepreneurs.' 4 As opposed to other actors who may
not develop such reputations, judges and legislators have both the
opportunity and the motivation to do so. This reputational feature of
government officials' making pronouncements of the law has been
128 See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1649 (2000) (providing a theory of the expressive role of law in changing norms).
129 Id. at 1668-69.
1.0 For a discussion of the subtleties of common knowledge, see Peter H. Huang,
Still Preying on Strategic Rreputation Models of Predation, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 437, 439 (2000)
(book review).
131 See McAdams, supra note 128, at 1669-71 ("Anything that makes law stand out
against other competing messages, by that reason alone makes it qualitatively more
'emphatic' than conflicting messages.").
132 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv.
453, 477-88 (1997) (outlining certain features of criminal law that are necessary to
maintain the "moral credibility" of that law).
133 See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of In-
ternalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1597-600 (2000) (explaining that norms are de-
veloped both by aligning law with morality and by harnessing some citizens' inherent
respect for the law).
134 See McAdams, supra note 128, at 1671-72 (claiming that judges and legislators
"may develop a reputation for correctly predicting behavioral change," due in part to
the "publicity and uniqueness of law").
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noted in other contexts. ' The above models emphasize how fiduci-
ary law can have important psychological and rhetorical roles in shap-
ing perceptions and behaviors in games.131
It is an empirical question whether broker-dealers actually do or
can have the above sort of preferences. The language of a fiduciary
duty of loyalty itself suggests that part of fiduciary law attempts to cre-
ate, foster, or strengthen such preferences. Recent empirical eco-
nomic research demonstrates that in a variety of contexts, "monetary
incentives may backfire and reduce ... compliance with rules.'
1
3
7
Tom Brown, a former Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (DLJ) bank-
ing analyst, stated that he decided in August 1998 that "it was worth
more for my pride" to refuse $400,000 and the usual DLJ severance
deal requiring him to keep quiet concerning analysts' practices.""
There is also anecdotal evidence that professional securities traders
react emotionally to financial decisions, information, and outcomes.1
39
Outside the securities context, there is evidence that monopolists do
not always charge monopoly prices and that corporate personnel de-
partments do not always behave as harshly as neoclassical labor-market
models predict. 40 There is also experimental and empirical evidence
that wanting to avoid guilt and stigma motivates tax compliance.1
4'
135 See Cooter, supra note 133, at 1598-600 (pointing to one view that instead of
treating the law as an external restraint, some judges use the law to "express their own
political vision"); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1697, 1719 (1996) (explaining how the pronouncements of legislators and judges
translate preferences into rules governing behavior).
For a similar point, see Amy L. Wax, Expressive Law and Oppressive Norms: A
Comment on McAdams's 'A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, "86 VA. L. REv. 1731,
1769 (2000) (providing an alternative theory of the expressive role of law in changing
norms that focuses on moral sentiments).
137ARMIN FALK & ERNST FEHR, PSYCHOLOGIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF INCENTIVES 1
(Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 3185, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=301322.
38 Wall Street Prophets, supra note 26.
13 See MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR'S POKER 15 (1989) (assessing the founder and head of
Salomon's legendary bond-trading Arbitrage Group, John Meriwether: "He had, I
think, a profound ability to control the two emotions that commonly destroy traders-
fear and greed-and it made him as noble as a man who pursues his self-interest so
fiercely can be."); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 176-77 (2000) (describing the feelings and emo-
tional toll on some principals of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management dur-
ing its mounting losses in September 1998).
140 See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 113, at 1284-90, 1292-96 (explaining a model of fair-
ness and applying it to monopolistic pricing and labor economics).
141 See Huang & Wu, supra note 31, at 401-02 (summarizing the literature on the
effects of emotions on tax-evasion decisions).
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Recent empirical results of experimental games found a positive
correlation between an individual's decision and that individual's ex-
pectation about another individual's expectation of that decision. 1,1
This finding supports the notion that a player does not want to disap-
point another player by not meeting that other player's expectations
of the first player's actions. Experimental dictator games found the
same positive correlation.143
III. EXTENSIONS AND ANOTHER APPLICATION OF THE BASIC MODEL
A. Extensions
The analyses of the games in Figures 1 through 5 remain valid if,
instead of feeling expectation-dependent guilt from breaching a duty
of loyalty, broker-dealers feel expectation-dependent pride from hon-
oring such a duty of loyalty. While guilt might be a form of negative
utility or a cost in measuring social welfare, it must be offset by the
anger or disappointment that investors experience if broker-dealers
betray them. Thus, the fact that some broker-dealers may feel guilt
does not necessarily imply that guilt should reduce compensatory
damages. Pride from not breaching a duty of loyalty clearly is a posi-
tive utility or a benefit in assessing social welfare. 44 Two of the three
outcomes involve no guilt being experienced in equilibrium. One of
those outcomes would involve pride if, instead of experiencing guilt
from breaching a fiduciary duty of loyalty, broker-dealers feel pride
from complying with a fiduciary duty of loyalty. Only the mixed strat-
egy equilibrium involves any actual experience of guilt from breach-
ing fiduciary duties of loyalty. Replacing guilt with pride increases so-
cial welfare in the mixed strategy equilibrium. With either guilt or
pride, greater- or higher-profile enforcement of and larger penalties
142 See Martin Dufwenberg & Uri Gneezy, Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost
Wallet Game, 30 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 163, 172 tbl.VI, 173-74 fig.2 (2000) (demon-
strating the connection between individuals' expectations).
13 ld. at 173-74 fig.2, 175 tbl.VIl.
144 See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, MORAL RULES AND THE MORAL
SENTIMENTs: TOWARD A THEORY OF AN OPTIMAL MORAL SYSTEM 24-26 (John M. Olin
Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 342, 2001) (pro-
viding an economic analysis of the moral sanctions of guilt and virtue, taking into ac-
count guilt's cost and virtue's utility), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/342.pdf; Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as
Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 227, 232 (2002) (considering the social
costs and utility "associated with enforcement of moral rules through... moral incen-
tives").
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for broker-dealer breaches of a fiduciary duty of loyalty can reduce
misbehavior by changing broker-dealers' expectations about investors'
expectations of broker-dealers' behavior. In turn, investors' altered
expectations of broker-dealers change broker-dealers' preferences
and thus change their behavior. But even without increased enforce-
ment, imposing a fiduciary duty can have psychological and behav-
ioral effects in the short run. A natural question is: Why not impose
fiduciary duties everywhere? One answer is that there exists a scarce
quantity of guilt people can experience and this constrains the ability
to utilize guilt. 4' Another answer is that enforcement resources are
limited as well.
People differ in how much, if at all, they care about what others
think of them. 46 This variance means that broker-dealers will differ in
how much expectation-dependent guilt they experience from breach-
ing a fiduciary duty of loyalty. In an extreme case, a broker-dealer
might not feel any guilt, but rather even a perverse sense of pleasure
from exploiting a trusting and unsuspecting investor. There is cer-
tainly anecdotal evidence that such behavior exists.' For such bro-
ker-dealers, a fiduciary duty may crowd out whatever intrinsic morality
the broker-dealer would otherwise have exhibited. Ample economet-
ric and experimental evidence supports the conclusion that financial
rewards and external regulations may crowd out intrinsic motiva-
tion. 14" Thus, monetary or legal incentives can drive out emotional
and moral incentives. This possibility raises the potential for unscru-
pulous broker-dealers to crowd out those with consciences in securi-
145 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 144, at 3, 7, 29-31 (discussing constraints on
the actual experience of guilt and therefore its use).
146 Chaim Fershtman & Yoram Weiss, Why Do We Care What Others Think About Us?,
in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZA'ION 133, 134 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putter-
man eds., 1998).
147 See generally FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL
STREET 14-15 (1997) (describing the blood-thirsty attitude that pervaded investment
banks during the 1990s).
148 See, e.g., EDwARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND
SELF-DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3-10 (1985) (introducing the theories be-
hind the study of motivation); Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on
Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 114 (1971) (summarizing
various studies "conducted to investigate the effects of externally mediated rewards on
intrinsic motivation"); Bruno S. Frey, Institutions and Morale: The Crowding-Out Effect, in
ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION, supra note 146, at 437, 446-54 (providing
evidence that external regulations crowd out individual intrinsic motivation); Thane S.
Pittman & Jack F. Heller, Social Motivation, 38 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 461, 463 (1987)
(commenting on the "large number of studies demonstrating decreased intrinsic moti-
vation following reward").
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ties markets where the absence of guilt can be financially rewarding.
But if all broker-dealers were unscrupulous, investors would not hire
any broker-dealers. This outcome is the second of the three psycho-
logical equilibria.
Any guilt that broker-dealers may experience from breaching fi-
duciary duties of loyalty might be offset by such other motivations as
not disappointing the broker-dealers' colleagues, families, and super-
visors. Whether broker-dealers feel guilt can also depend on how
many of their peers engage in unfair or unscrupulous practices. In
that case, herding, which occurs for other reasons among securities
professionals, can reduce how much guilt broker-dealers experience
from breaching a duty of loyalty and lead to a situation of "infectious
greed.' 45 In fact, over time, some securities firms may screen for or
train their broker-dealers to feel guilt from behavior that deviates
from corporate norms. Those norms or explicit organizational rules
may support being loyal to investors. But there may be other norms
or unwritten rules that push in the opposite direction. There is anec-
dotal and ethnographic evidence of such norms.5 The moral over-
load from these conflicting values can lead to efforts to relieve the
moral dissonance, including casuistry, compartmentalization, escape,
moral reconstruction, rationalization, and redemptive acts.'
15
Finally, replacing the assumption of rational expectations on the
part of investors with the assumption of adaptive expectations by in-
vestors extends the analysis in Part 1.152 In the models of Part II, in-
vestors rationally or correctly forecast broker-dealers' future behavior.
If we assume instead that investors adaptively forecast broker-dealers'
future behavior based on broker-dealers' past behavior, then we can
extend the analysis in Part II to explain how investors may come to
trust broker-dealers more and more over time as broker-dealers be-
149 Federal Reserve Board's Semiannual Monetary Policy Report Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd.), www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2002/july/
testimony.htm.
150 See generally MITCHEL Y. ABOLAFIA, MAKING MARKETS: OPPORTUNISM AND
RESTRAINT ON WALL STREET (1996) (offering an ethnography of the subcultures of the
markets for bonds, stocks, and futures); LEWIS, supra note 139 (providing an insider's
account of the prevailing rules and norms that operate within a major Wall Street in-
vestment bank); PARTNOY, supra note 147, at 14 (reporting one investment bank's
"barbarous approach to its clients' increasing derivatives losses").
151 Timur Kuran, Moral Overload and Its Alleviation, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND
ORGANIZATION, supra note 146, at 231, 249-58.
152 See generally Stout, supra note 15 (arguing that such a replacement of assump-
tions better explains investor confidence).
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have well historically on average. But due to the lag in the adaptive
expectations of investors, when broker-dealers misbehave, investors
are caught off guard. Once broker-dealers misbehave, restoring trust
by investors is difficult because of the lag in the adaptive expectations
of investors. This cycle of expectations by investors and behavior by
broker-dealers captures in essence the bull market of the 1990s and
the more recent crisis in investor confidence.
B. An Application to Employee Investing
Guilt and pride may also cause employees to invest disproportion-
ately in their employers' securities. Employees may feel guilty or dis-
loyal to a company if they do not invest heavily in their employers' se-
curities. Alternatively, employees may invest heavily in their
employers' securities because they feel pride in, or loyalty toward, that
company. Pride also explains why some investors sell their winning
stocks too quickly-namely to convert paper winnings into real ones-
but do so at the expense of favorable tax treatment.' 5 Employers en-
courage their employees to invest in the employers' stock to enhance
employee productivity and corporate performance. If a company
appears to be doing well financially or if employees like to believe in
their companies' future prospects, then employees may have addi-
tional emotional reasons to invest heavily in their employers' stock:
euphoria; exuberance; greed; and general feelings of positivity, well-
being, or goodness. ' 5'5
Such lack of adequate portfolio diversification can have ruinous
consequences for employee-investors. Heavy investing by employees
of their 401(k) plans in their employers' securities is very risky be-
1511 See Hersh M. Shefrin & Meir Statman, How Not to Make Money in the Stock Market,
PSYCHOL. TODAY, Feb. 1986, at 52, 57 (describing how pride may interfere with ra-
tional thinking about when to sell stocks).
154 See OLIVIA S. MITCHELL & STEPHEN P. UTKUS, COMPANY STOCK AND
RETIREMENT PLAN DIVERSIFICATION 21-24 (Pension Research Council, The Wharton
Sch., Univ. of Pa., Working Paper No. 2002-4, 2002) (exploring the benefits and risks
of employees' holding company stock), available at http://prc.wharton.upenn.edu/
prc/,rc.html.
, Cf Shlomo Benartzi, Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) Accounts to
Company Stock, 56J. FIN. 1747, 1748 (2001) (investigating a related but alternative rea-
son for individuals investing their retirement savings heavily in their employers'
stock-namely believing that abnormally high past performance of their employer's
stock is representative of such performance in the future).
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cause of insufficient portfolio diversification.' 5" Enron's bankruptcy
and the resulting huge losses that Enron employees suffered from in-
vesting all or most of their 401 (k) plans in Enron stock is one highly
publicized, recent example of this danger.
Enron employees who invested heavily in Enron's stock suffered
substantial losses not only ex post, but also ex ante, because employee
investors are exposed to firm-specific risk that could have been diversi-
fied away. In other words, holding company stock is inefficient for all
employees, regardless of an employee's risk tolerance, because despite
being exposed to higher risk, employee-investors earn precisely the
same returns as fully diversified investors. Employee-investors value
their companies' stock at less than its market value because of this im-
balance.
Employees and companies would both be better off utilizing di-
rect cash compensation instead of stock grants. A recent study found
that employees sacrifice quite a lot by investing in their employers'
stock relative to a well-diversified stock portfolio with the same level of
risk.' Under reasonable assumptions, these costs average 58% of the
employers' stock market value.' s Thus, a 401(k) plan that has a mar-
ket value of $1 million would be worth only $420,000 to an employee
with an undiversified portfolio. "15 9 Not only employees, but also their
employers bear these costs of lack of diversification. Employers share
in these costs because they are granting stock to employees instead of
issuing it to fully diversified investors, who place a higher value on that
stock. For example, to grant an employee stock worth $42,000, a
company must give that employee stock having a $100,000 market
156 SeeJONATHAN BURTON, INVESTMENT TITANS: INVESTMENT INSIGHTS FROM THE
MINDS THAT MOVE WALL STREET 4-13 (2001) (explaining the intuition behind the idea
of diversification); HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT
DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959) (exploring the relationship between mean-
variance analysis and theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty); Harry
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) (presenting the original theoretical
formulation of diversification). Markowitz shared the 1990 Nobel Prize in Economics
in part for his pioneering insights about portfolio diversification.
157LISA MEULBROEK, COMPANY STOCK IN PENSION PLANS: HOW COSTLY IS IT? 4
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 02-058, 2002), available at http://
www.people.hbs.edu/lmeulbroek/02-058.pdf.
Id. at 3.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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value. 6' Companies are essentially compensating employees with
stock that is worth less to employees than it costs the companies.
162
Recently proposed legislation addresses the problem of retire-
ment portfolios' being too concentrated in employers' securities by
amending Title I of ERISA. 163 These reforms can be seen as counter-
balancing any guilt employees may experience from not investing
heavily in their employers' securities (or, equivalently, counterbalanc-
ing any pride employees may experience from investing heavily in
their employers' securities). The Pension Security Act of 2002 man-
dates periodic reports disclosing the plan sponsor's financial health. 64
It also imposes diversification requirements for defined contribution
plans that hold employer securities. 165 These diversification require-
ments mitigate any guilt employees might experience from not invest-
ing in their employers' securities.
The models in Part II of this Article explain how proposed legisla-
tive reforms in response to the Enron tragedy can alter norms about
how much employees should be investing in their employers' securi-
ties. Thus, guilt affects different actors in securities investing and has
different effects. It is socially desirable to encourage via fiduciary law
a certain type of guilt by securities professionals and legally discourage
another type of guilt by employee-investors.
CONCLUSION
Most investors lack the inclination, knowledge, and time to make
their initial and subsequent investment decisions based directly upon
the information that companies provide. Instead, investors typically
base their investment decisions upon information filtered by securities
professionals, such as brokers and dealers. Investors who manage
their own investments, such as day traders, do so perhaps too actively
and in ways that involve a different set of emotions than guilt."" Else-
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Pension Security Act of 2002, H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. (2002) (amending Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
Id. § 101.
165 Id.§ 104.
166 See JOHN R. NOFSINGER, INVESTMENT MADNESS: HOW PSYCHOLOGY AFFECTS
YOUR INVESTING... AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 123-42 (2001) (describing day trad-
ers' activities and mindset).
TRUST, GUILT, AND SECURITIES REGULATION
where, I analyze the implications of such other emotions for securities
regulation.'67
This Article has analyzed the relationship between investors and
broker-dealers. In particular, the Article provided formal models ex-
plaining how fiduciary law can alter broker-dealers' expectations
about investors' expectations about broker-dealers' behavior. These
changed expectations can alter broker-dealers' expectation-
dependent guilt and behavior. During the great bull market of the
1990s, guilt and legal enforcement declined because investors earned
very high net returns. Securities professionals could reject or ignore
their feelings of guilt over cheating clients if, despite their broker-
dealers' cheating, the clients were making lots of money and were
happy about it. There was little pressure for vigorous legal enforce-
ment because the securities markets experienced historical record
highs. The recent string of highly publicized corporate and account-
ing scandals may usher in a new era with greater legal enforcement
against,16 86 and higher levels of guilt experienced from, corporate mal-
feasance.
167 Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets,
in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisi & Vernon
Smith eds., forthcoming 2003).
168 See Brooke A. Masters, U.S. to Dy to Add to Waksal Sentence, WASH. POST, Nov. 22,
2002, at E4 (reporting that federal prosecutors signaled a tough approach to white-
collar crime by seeking extra prison time for lmClone Systems Inc. founder Samuel
Waksal, the first major defendant to be sentenced in the recent wave of business scan-
dals).
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